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Social Media Threats: Examining the Canadian
Criminal Law Response
Benjamin Perrin*
INTRODUCTION
The rapid proliferation of social media networks in the last decade has been
truly remarkable. These virtual global communities have revolutionized a wide
range of fields, including journalism, communications, marketing, politics, civic
engagement and advocacy. This borderless digital common also presents a
challenge for national criminal laws, which are only beginning to grapple with
the impact and implications of this emerging technology. With so many
Canadians on social media,1 it is unsurprising that criminal activity is taking
place on these networks.
As part of the Social Media Crime project, all reported Canadian judicial
decisions related to criminal law and social media networks were identified and
reviewed.2 The most common categories of criminality recognized were: (1)
sexual offences, (2) threats, and (3) criminal harassment.3 This article examines
*
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Associate Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia;
email: perrin@allard.ubc.ca. The author is grateful for the research assistance of
Matthew Scott and Victoria Wicks, feedback from Dr. Alfred Hermida and Dr. Patrick
McCurdy (collaborators on the Social Media Crime project), and financial support from
the Foundation for Legal Research and Canadian Bar Association Law for the Future
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Shea Bennett, ‘‘59% use Facebook in Canada (LinkedIn: 30%, Twitter: 25%,
Instagram: 16%)”, Ad Week (4 February 2015), online: <http://www.adweek.com/
socialtimes/canada-social-media-study/614360>.
See ‘‘The Social Media Crime Project”, Peter A. Allard School of Law, online: <http://
www.allard.ubc.ca/perrin/social-media-crime-project>. Key word searches (in both
English and French) were performed to identify all potentially relevant reported judicial
decisions using Quicklaw’s ‘‘All Canadian Court Cases” database. This search (current
to May 1, 2017) revealed 1,844 potentially relevant decisions related to Facebook
(launched in 2004), 149 related to Twitter (launched in 2006) and 15 related to Snapchat
(launched in 2011). These three social media networks were selected because they are
commonly understood in everyday usage and in the social media literature to constitute
social media networks, and because they are among the most commonly used by
Canadians. The figures for the number of decisions above are totals of English and
French reported decisions so there is some very minor duplication in them (e.g., a
Supreme Court of Canada decision mentioning one of these social media platforms
would be counted twice since they appear in both official languages, however there are
very few of these). Many of these cases merely mentioned the applicable social media
network in passing or in a non-substantive manner. However, those decisions dealing
with social media networks in a material or substantive manner were identified and then
categorized based on the type of offence or legal issue.

76

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[16 C.J.L.T.]

how Canadian criminal law is responding to threats on major social media
networks.
Uttering threats, contrary to s. 264.1 of the Criminal Code,4 is the second
most prevalent police-reported violent criminal incident in Canada. In 2016,
there were 60,448 police-reported incidents of uttering threats (167/100,000
people) while 16,823 people were charged with this offence. 5 Uttering threats
accounted for 15.84% of all violent police-reported incidents.6 Media reports
and judicial decisions reveal that criminal threats are being made on social media
networks.7
While recent international scholarship has explored threats on social media
networks,8 the Canadian legal literature has yet to examine how our criminal law
3

4
5

6
7

8

For a summary of reported Canadian judicial decisions related to substantive criminal
offences and social media networks, see Benjamin Perrin, Social Media Crime: Annotated
Criminal Code (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association Law for the Future Fund, 2017),
online: <http://www.allard.ubc.ca/sites/www.allard.ubc.ca/files/uploads/Perrin/social_media_crime_in_canada_-_annotated_criminal_code_-_perrin.pdf>.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 264.1 [Criminal Code].
Statistics Canada, ‘‘Incident-based crime statistics, by detailed violations, annual”,
CANSIM Table 252-0051 (modified July 24, 2017), online: <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2520051> [Incident-based crime statistics].
Incident-based crime statistics, ibid (calculation by author).
See e.g., Sunny Dhillon, ‘‘Police Grapple with How to Handle Threats Online”, The
Globe and Mail (17 August 2012), online: <https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/
british-columbia/police-grapple-with-how-to-handle-threats-online/article4487785/
?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&>.
For U.S. literature, see Melissa A. Whitehead, ‘‘MySpace, WhoseSpace? The Impact of
Semi-Private Social Media on Threats and the First Amendment” (2013) 39:1 New Eng J
Crim & Civ Confinement 193; P. Brooks Fuller, ‘‘Evaluating Intent in True Threat
Cases: The Importance of Context in Analyzing Threatening Internet Messages” (2015)
37:1 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 37; Adrienne Scheffey, ‘‘Defining Intent in 165
Characters of Less: A Call for Clarity in the Intent Standard of True Threats After
Virginia v. Black” (2015) 69:3 U Miami L Rev 861; Mark Strasser, ‘‘Incitement, Threats,
and Constitutional Guarantees: First Amendment Protections pre- and post-Elonis”
(2015) 14:1 U New Hampshire L Rev 163; Michael Pierce, ‘‘Prosecuting Online Threats
After Elonis” (2016) 110:4 Nw U L Rev 995-1006; Enrique Monagas & Carlos Monagas,
‘‘Prosecuting Threats in the Age of Social Media” (2016) 36:3 N Ill U L Rev 57; Lyrissa
Barnett & Linda R. Norbut, ‘‘#IU: Considering the Context of Online Threats” (5
February 2018) Cal L Rev, forthcoming; University of Missouri School of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2018-11, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3118659>.
For U.K. literature, see Paul David Mora & Ashley Savage, ‘‘Chambers v DPP: credible
threat or a joke in bad taste?” (2012) 23:8 Entertainment L Rev (UK) 253; Nick Tall,
‘‘DPP interim guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social
media - a matter of common sense?” (2013) 24:3 Entertainment L Rev 88; Sara Mansoori
& Eloise Le Santo, ‘‘Criminal law and social media” (2014) 158:41 Solicitors Journal
Supplement (Bar Focus) 29; Lilian Edwards, ‘‘Section 127 of the Communications Act
2003: threat or menace?” Computers & Law (October/November 2012), online: <https://
www.scl.org/articles/2579-section-127-of-the-communications-act-2003-threat-or-menace>. For other jurisdictions, see Expertise Centre on Cybercrime, ‘‘Case Note:
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is responding to this phenomenon. This article begins to address this gap in the
literature by identifying five key findings with respect to how Canadian criminal
law is dealing with social media threats.
First, a major substantive issue in prosecuting social media threats is
establishing mental fault. The general case law on the threats offence in s.
264.1(1) of the Criminal Code requires that the accused have intended to
intimidate or be taken seriously. This high level of subjective mens rea has been
difficult to establish in some reported cases, although a critical review of some of
these judgments reveals legal and factual errors. Social media postings often lack
the detailed context of physical-world interactions, making it more difficult to
engage in the contextual analysis that is necessary to determine whether what is
objectively read as a threat of bodily harm was subjectively intended to
intimidate or be taken seriously. At the same time, regardless of the intention of
the accused, the effect on the subject of the threat (and others who may be
exposed to it) may be the same. This suggests that while the criminal law has a
role to play in addressing threats made on social media networks, it cannot and
should not be expected to be a complete answer to threats of violence online.
Social media platforms have a leading role to play in addressing online threats.
Their response to threats made on their platforms is an ongoing controversy that
has generated significant debate among the public and social media users.
Second, threats on social media networks against women, minority groups
and political leaders were observable in reported judicial decisions. This is
consistent with the academic literature that has found sexism, racism and
Islamophobia prevalent online. Victimology has shown that vulnerable and
marginalized groups, such as women and minority groups, are
disproportionately affected as victims of crime in the “off-line” world. It
should come as no surprise for the situation to be replicated, and even potentially
worse, in the online world. Indeed, the social media environment can be
particularly hostile and amplify the exposure of these groups to threats of
violence.
Third, social media threats were made in several reported decisions by people
with mental health issues, which ranged from more to less serious. An even more
prevalent similar observation is apparent in criminal harassment (i.e., stalking)
charges involving social media networks. This suggests that more thought and

Netherlands: LJN BW9843 - threats via Twitter” (2013) 10 Digital Evidence & Electronic
Signature L Rev 218; Chung Nian Lam & Gareth Liu, ‘‘Singapore: criminal intimidation
via Facebook messaging” (2016) 32:2 Computer L & Security Rev 379. For a discussion
of threats and hate crimes on social media related to Muslims, see Imran Awan & Irene
Zempi, ‘‘‘I will Blow your face off’—Virtual and Physical World Anti-Muslim Hate
Crime” (2017) 57:2 British J Criminology 363 [Awan & Zempi, ‘‘I will Blow your face
off”]; Imran Awan, ‘‘Islamophobia and Twitter: A Typology of Online Hate Against
Muslims on Social Media” (2014) 6:2 Policy and Internet 133 [Awan, ‘‘Islamophobia and
Twitter”]; Imran Awan, ed., Islamophobia in Cyberspace: Hate Crimes Go Viral
(London: Routledge, 2016) [Awan, ‘‘Islamophobia in Cyberspace”].
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research into how to address the intersection between mental health and social
media crime is needed.
Fourth, it was surprising to find so few reported judicial decisions dealing
with evidentiary issues related to social media threats, given that this
communications technology is relatively new. This may be a testament to the
success of general evidentiary rules and principles applicable to all forms of
digital evidence. However, it bears mentioning that other types of social media
crime, such as sexual offences and terrorism-related offences, generated more
evidentiary decisions with respect to such evidence.
Fifth, while public debate about how to deal with abuse and vitriol on social
media networks is frequently framed as a contest between freedom of expression
and equality, Canadian jurisprudence has fairly categorically rejected the notion
that threats of violence are entitled to protection as freedom of expression. As a
result, freedom of expression has not been considered in any sustained fashion in
the reported social media threats cases.
This article begins by discussing the legislative history, essential elements,
and purpose of the threats offence in s. 264.1(1) of the Criminal Code.9 It then
analyzes major reported Canadian judicial decisions dealing with social media
threats, based on the five themes identified above. Finally, this article concludes
by highlighting the implications and limitations of this study, as well as areas for
future research.

BACKGROUND ON THE UTTERING THREATS OFFENCE
When the uttering threats offence was first enacted by Parliament in 1869, it
was limited to written threats to kill or murder someone. 10 However, the
legislative history of this offence reveals a steady expansion of the scope of the
offence to its current form that encompasses: (1) not just threats of death, but
also threats of bodily harm and threats against property and animals; and (2)
threats communicated in any manner.11 This enables the offence to apply to
emerging communications technology (including social media networks),
without the need for legislative amendment each time a new means of
communication is created.
Today, s. 264.1(1) of the Criminal Code sets out the uttering threats offence
as follows:
264.1 (1) Every one commits an offence who, in any manner, knowingly
utters, conveys or causes any person to receive a threat

(a) to cause death or bodily harm to any person;
9
10
11

Criminal Code, supra note 5, s. 264.1(1).
The Offences Against the Person Act, 1869, S.C. 1869, c. 20, s. 15.
Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 316; Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, R.S.C.
1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 38 & 53; Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1994, S.C. 1994, c. 44, s.
16.
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(b) to burn, destroy or damage real or personal property; or
(c) to kill, poison or injure an animal or bird that is the property of any
person.12
This article focuses on the first form of this offence, namely, threats to cause
death or bodily harm to any person.13 This is a hybrid offence, punishable by
way of indictment by up to five years imprisonment, or as a summary conviction
offence by up to 18 months imprisonment or a fine of up to $5,000 for an
individual or $100,000 for an organization.14
The essential elements of the uttering threats offence in s. 264.1(1)(a) of the
Criminal Code were consolidated and clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada
in R. v. McRae.15 The prohibited act (actus reus)16 is that the accused, in any
manner, uttered,17 conveyed or caused any person to receive a threat to cause
death or bodily harm18 to any person. Whether the accused’s conduct19
12
13

14
15

16
17

18

19

Criminal Code, supra note 5, s. 264.1(1).
For a threat on Facebook involving property, contrary to section 264.1(1)(b) of the
Criminal Code, see R. v. Saunders (2013), 343 Nfld. P.E.I.R. 271, 1066 A.P.R. 271, [2013]
N.J. No. 400 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.).
Criminal Code, supra note 5, s. 264.1(2).
R. c. McRae, 2013 SCC 68, 2013 CarswellQue 11603, 2013 CarswellQue 11604 (S.C.C.)
[McRae].
Ibid, at paras. 10-16.
‘‘Utters” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘‘[t]o say, express or publish”: See
Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed., sub verbo ‘‘utters”.
‘‘Bodily harm” is defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code, supra note 5, as ‘‘any hurt or injury
to a person that interferes with the health or comfort of the person and that is more than
merely transient or trifling in nature”. Bodily harm includes psychological harm: See R.
v. McCraw, 1991 CarswellOnt 1024, 1991 CarswellOnt 113, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72 (S.C.C.) at
81 [S.C.R.] [McCraw]. A threat of rape is considered a threat of bodily harm: McCraw,
ibid, at paras. 28-33; see also Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s London v. Scalera, 2000
SCC 24, 2000 CarswellBC 885, 2000 CarswellBC 886 (S.C.C.) at para. 120.
While the Court used the term ‘‘words” in McRae, supra note 15 at paras. 10-11, which
can mean written or spoken words, the offence is not limited to threats made through
words. Indeed, the Criminal Code, supra note 5, s. 264.1(1)(a) refers to threats as being
made ‘‘in any manner”. A threat may be non-verbal, consisting of a gesture or symbol
(e.g. an accused who, while being led out of court, points his hand to resemble a gun and
pulls the ‘‘trigger” at a witness in the case.) The key is that the accused is communicating
in any manner what a reasonable person would perceive to be a threat of death or bodily
harm. A restrictive interpretation of s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code that is limited to
spoken words alone would be arbitrary, lead to absurd outcomes, be inconsistent with
the purpose of the provision, and inconsistent with the legislative history of this provision
which has progressively increased its ambit from its initial focus only on letters or
writings to including threats made through numerous forms of communications to its
current version which refers broadly to threats made ‘‘in any manner”. Accordingly,
referring to the accused’s ‘‘conduct” rather than ‘‘words” is preferable since it
encompasses threats made in any manner. The following are examples of cases involving
non-verbal threats: R. c. Moise, 2017 QCCQ 598, 2017 CarswellQue 1149, EYB 2017276276 (C.Q.) (‘‘finger gun” gesture made at police officers, accompanied by ‘‘pow pow”
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constituted a threat of death or bodily harm is a question of law determined on
an objective standard: would a reasonable person fully aware of the
circumstances have perceived them to be a threat of death or bodily harm? 20
In making this assessment, while testimony from people who witnessed or were
the subject of the alleged threat may be considered in applying the reasonable
person standard, they are not determinative. The plain and ordinary meaning of
the words used is the starting point for analysis. Notably, it is unnecessary for the
Crown to prove that the intended recipient of the threat was ever made aware of
it or, if they were aware of it, that they were intimidated or took it seriously. 21 A
threat may be against an individual or against an ascertainable group (e.g. police
officers, a racial group, etc.).
With respect to mental fault (mens rea),22 the accused must have intended the
threat to intimidate or to be taken seriously.23 It is unnecessary to prove that the
accused intended the threat to be conveyed to the subject of the threat, or that
the accused intended to carry out the threat. In making this subjective
determination regarding the intent of the accused, inferences may be drawn
from all of the circumstances, including the perceptions of any witnesses and the
alleged victim.

PURPOSE OF THE UTTERING THREATS OFFENCE
The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that the purpose of the uttering
threats offence in s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is to protect against fear and
intimidation. In R. v. Clemente,24 Justice Cory stated that the purpose of the
uttering threats offence is ‘‘to protect the exercise of freedom of choice by
preventing intimidation. The section makes it a crime to issue threats without any
further action being taken beyond the threat itself.”25 Similarly, in R. v.

20

21

22
23

24
25

sound, was a threat); R. c. Bouchard, 1994 CarswellQue 980, EYB 1994-55822 (C.A.
Que.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 189 N.R. 397 (note) (finding generally that
words or gestures can qualify as threats); but see R. v. Dumoulin, 2000 CarswellOnt 3494,
38 C.R. (5th) 66 (Ont. S.C.J.) (finding that ‘‘utters” is limited to the spoken word and so,
given that the Crown had particularized the charge as ‘‘uttering”, a gesture would not
qualify as a threat).
McRae, supra note 15 at para. 14 citing R. v. Batista, 2008 ONCA 804, 2008 CarswellOnt
7154, 62 C.R. (6th) 376 (C.A.) at para. 34 [Batista].
See also R. v. O’Brien, 2013 SCC 2, 2013 CarswellMan 3, 2013 CarswellMan 4 (S.C.C.) at
para. 13, per Fish J.
McRae, supra note 15 at paras. 17-23.
While s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code uses the word ‘‘knowingly”, the Supreme Court
of Canada has consistently interpreted this provision as requiring proof that the accused
meant the threat to intimidate or be taken seriously. See R. v. Clemente, 1994
CarswellMan 152, 1994 CarswellMan 380, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 758 at 763, 95 Man. R. (2d)
161 (S.C.C.) [Clemente]; McRae, supra note 15 at para. 17.
Clemente, ibid.
Clemente, ibid, at 761-762.
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McCraw,26 Justice Cory held that ‘‘[t]he aim and purpose of the offence [in s.
264.1 of the Criminal Code] is to protect against fear and intimidation. In
enacting the section, Parliament was moving to protect personal freedom of
choice and action, a matter of fundamental importance to members of a
democratic society.”27
The Supreme Court of Canada has also recognized that threats of death or
bodily harm are inherently violent.28 Indeed, threats of death or bodily harm
could foreseeably cause emotional distress and even psychological harm to the
person against whom they are directed.
This articulation of the purpose of s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code as
recognized in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence is compelling but
incomplete, given that ‘‘[t]he Crown need not prove that the intended recipient of
the threat was made aware of it, or if aware of it, that he or she was intimidated
by it or took it seriously.”29 In other words, how can the purpose of the uttering
threats offence be limited to protecting the subject of the threat from fear and
intimidation if they need not even be aware of it, intimidated by it, or take it
seriously? The purpose of s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is arguably more
expansive than has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada
to date in at least two respects.
First, the uttering threats offence in s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
functions as an incipient or inchoate offence. It is a preparatory crime that
criminalizes conduct preceding the commission of more serious offences that are
articulated in the threat itself (e.g. murder and assault). 30 Indeed, the Law
Reform Commission has described threat-based offences as ‘‘preventive crimes”
that exist for the purpose of giving police the power to intervene before a physical
offence takes occurs.31
Second, an ancillary purpose of the threats offence in s. 264.1(1)(a) of the
Criminal Code could be to suppress threats of death or bodily harm because of
their potential negative effect on third parties and society. Such threats, if left
unsanctioned, may help normalize violence, sow social unrest, undermine the
rule of law, and disturb the peaceful enjoyment of life in a free and democratic
26
27
28

29
30

31

McCraw, supra note 18.
Ibid, at 82.
R. v. Steele, 2014 SCC 61, 2014 CarswellMan 589, 2014 CarswellMan 590 (S.C.C.) at
para. 47 [Steele].
McRae, supra note 15 at para. 13.
For a discussion of preparatory crime, see R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, 2009 CarswellAlta
1958, 2009 CarswellAlta 1959 at paras. 25, 33 and 34. It is also noted that section 264.1 of
the Criminal Code is the first offence to appear under the ‘‘Assault” heading in the
Criminal Code and immediately before the offence of assault in section 265.
Donald Stuart, ‘‘Working Paper on Homicide, Assault, and Threats (1st Draft)” (1979)
Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1979) at 66 (this language appears very similar to that used to describe inchoate offences)
[1979 LRC Working Paper].
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society.32 However, such an ancillary purpose is an even greater step removed
from physical violence actually being meted out. As discussed in the conclusion,
the need to consider such a purpose to make sense of this offence is an indicator
of just how broad it has become.

TRENDS AND ISSUES IN SOCIAL MEDIA THREATS JURISPRUDENCE
Now that the legislative history, essential elements and purpose of the threats
offence in s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code have been set out, we can turn to an
examination of the themes in the jurisprudence related to threats committed on
social media networks.

1. Difficulties in Establishing Mental Fault for Social Media Threats
As discussed above, the Crown prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused intended to intimidate or be taken seriously in making
what reasonable people would consider to be a threat of death or bodily harm.
This is particularly challenging with respect to threats on social media networks,
as courts are adjudicating in a relatively new environment, which is also
constantly changing. The judicial understanding of social media networks is
significant, since it affects how judges will consider all of the circumstances in
evaluating evidence of an alleged social media threat. I begin by examining the
first reported judicial decision where a criminal offence was allegedly committed
on a social media network in Canada.

R. v. Sather
In R. v. Sather,33 the Children’s Aid Society (‘‘CAS”) took custody of the
accused’s newborn son (‘‘Kyle”). A CAS employee was searching Facebook to
find any references to the agency and found ‘‘frightening postings” on the
accused’s Facebook page. The accused was charged for making threats of death
or bodily harm, contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.34 The accused
admitted that he made the Facebook postings. They refer to the accused in the
third person, by his first name (‘‘Dan”):
September 16, 2007 (10:53 a.m.)
“when I find out what nurse called CAS may god have murcey [sic] on
my soul cause I’m going straight to hell with a 25 yr pit stop in prison”
October 23, 2007 (1:25 p.m.)
“Dan is gonna go suicidal bomb CAS”
November 5, 2007 (4:52 p.m.)
“Dan is sick of all the bull shit and in the midst of planning a tacticle
[sic] strike to get kyle back and disappearing off the face of the earth.”
32

33
34

See R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, 2012 CarswellOnt 15515, 2012 CarswellOnt 15516 at
para. 70 [Khawaja].
R. v. Sather, 2008 ONCJ 98, 2008 CarswellOnt 1286 (C.J.) [Sather].
Ibid, at paras. 1-4.
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November 9, 2007 (9:56 a.m.)
“Dan is plan B is in full operation as of Nov. 23 first the man power
was set up then the fire power is obtained now 2 weeks to find out
where there keeping him.”
November 16, 2007 (10:25 a.m.)
“Dan is scared its almost time.”
November 20, 2007 (4:20 p.m.)
“Dan is I have no son think what u will I give up.”35

Justice R. Blouin of the Ontario Court of Justice readily concluded that these
Facebook postings by the accused satisfied the actus reus of uttering threats,
because, viewed objectively, they would have conveyed a threat of death or
bodily harm to a reasonable person. However, Justice Blouin held that the
Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the
requisite mental fault for the offence and, therefore, acquitted him of these
charges.
Justice Blouin cited the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v.
Clemente 36 as authority for the proposition that the mental fault element for
uttering threats, contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, is that ‘‘the
defendant must intend the words to instill fear or intimidate”. 37 However, this is
an error of law and an incorrect description of what the Supreme Court of
Canada decided in Clemente.
The very issue in Clemente was the mental fault element for the uttering
threats offence in s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. In Clemente, the accused
argued that the mental fault for this offence was that the accused intended to
intimidate or instill fear, while the Crown argued that it is sufficient that the
accused intended that the threat be taken seriously.38 Justice Cory, writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, held that ‘‘[t]he requisite intent can be
framed in either manner [. . .] The mens rea is that the words be spoken or written
as a threat to cause death or serious bodily harm; that is, they were meant to
intimidate or to be taken seriously.”39 This was affirmed in a subsequent decision
by the Court in R. v. McRae as follows:40 ‘‘the fault element [for s. 264.1(1)(a) of
the Criminal Code] is disjunctive: it can be established by showing either that the
accused intended to intimidate or intended that the threats be taken seriously”.41
However, as noted above, in R. v. Sather Justice Blouin incorrectly stated that
Clemente ‘‘concludes that the defendant must intend the words to instill fear or
intimidate”.42 Justice Blouin’s legal error is repeated later in stating ‘‘[t]here are
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Sather, ibid, at para. 6.
Clemente, supra note 23.
Sather, supra note 33 at para. 8.
Clemente, supra note 23 at 761.
Ibid, at 761, 763.
McRae, supra note 15.
McRae, ibid, at para. 18 (emphasis in original).
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many reasons why I conclude the postings were not meant to intimidate.”43
Nowhere in Justice Blouin’s decision is there any mention or acknowledgement
that the mental fault of uttering threats could be satisfied if the accused simply
intended their threat of death or bodily harm to be taken seriously. Indeed, it
appears as though Justice Blouin has mistakenly adopted the narrower
articulation of the mental fault element for uttering threats that had been
argued unsuccessfully by the appellant in Clemente.
This error of law could have been corrected on appellate review, but R. v.
Sather was not appealed. Justice Blouin’s misstatement of the mental fault
element for uttering threats, contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code,
should obviously not be followed and it also calls into question Justice Blouin’s
subsequent conclusion that the Crown prosecutor in R. v. Sather had not proven
the mental fault of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately,
Justice Blouin’s error has already been reproduced without correction in a law
journal article.44
After incorrectly stating the law on the mental fault requirement for uttering
threats under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, Justice Blouin provides four
reasons for concluding that the accused lacked the requisite mens rea:
Firstly, expert evidence was called to explain how people use Facebook.
Jesse Hirch testified that people who profile themselves embellish their
character. They deliberately say provocative things to elicit a response
from their Facebook “friends”. In a sense they construct an alternate
persona.
Secondly, even without expert evidence to interpret them, it is clear that
the postings were expressions of emotions directed towards people who
might be sympathetic to Mr. Sather’s anger at losing his son. Only a
fortuitous search by a CAS employee brought this to the attention of
the authorities.
Thirdly, Mr. Sather had numerous direct contacts with CAS personnel
and nurses at York Central Hospital and not one time did he do or say
anything that might instil fear. Aside from being, to a minimal degree,
agitated, in my view understandably he was polite and concerned. If his
intent was to intimidate he had plenty of opportunity, yet did nothing.
Fourthly, Mr. Sather testified that he posted these items to blow off
steam as he had been taught in a prior anger management course. In
different circumstances I might have found that explanation to be selfserving and convenient, but given all that I find from the above reasons,
and observing Mr. Sather to testify in a straightforward manner about
these matters, including a number of admissions that did not cast a
42
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positive light on himself, including admitting he thought about killing
someone, I conclude he was telling the truth and I accept his evidence.45

Each of these points merits unpacking. First, Justice Blouin does not justify
the basis for Mr. Hirsh’s46 qualification as an expert in this decision. Mr. Hirsh’s
claims about how and why people use Facebook, particularly with respect to
constructing an ‘‘alternate persona”, are psychological or sociological in nature
and are framed as broad generalizations. Yet an open source search reveals that
Mr. Hirsh does not appear to be qualified in these fields. Instead he is described
as ‘‘an artist, futurist, researcher and internet strategist” who holds a Masters
degree from Ryerson University related to algorithms and predictive analytics. 47
It is, therefore, suspect whether he should have been qualified as an expert in this
case to give evidence of this nature and whether the claims that he made, which
were relied upon by Justice Blouin, are valid as expert evidence. 48
The notion that most people use alternate personas online is part of early
thinking on how people interacted in the beginning of the Internet era in the mid1990s, which predated social media networks by a decade. This literature
suggested that online identity is ‘‘de-centered and multiple” 49 and was based
largely on online simulations, role-playing and fantasy. Certainly, some people
portray themselves differently in their social media interactions than they may in
their offline activities, or even create anonymous social media accounts. Yet
contemporary literature on identity and social media has advanced significantly,
suggesting that there is a meaningful link between a person’s identity and their
social media activities and persona.50 It has also developed the concept of the
‘‘networked self”, which recognizes the connection between online and off-line
identity and conduct.51 Understanding of the context of social media networks
has, therefore, advanced significantly since the decision in R. v. Sather, which it
45
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bears reminding, was the first such reported decision on social media crime by a
Canadian criminal court. Given the myriad concerns about the expert evidence in
R. v. Sather, the ‘‘alternate persona” generalization should not be followed. 52
Regardless of the validity of the expert evidence in R. v. Sather, it is not at all
clear that an individual who was making threatening social media postings using
an ‘‘alternate persona” would, for that reason alone, have any less intention to
intimidate or be taken seriously. The opposite could be more plausible, namely,
that by adopting an alternate persona someone may be less reticent to make
threatening statements on a social media network than in face-to-face
interactions due to their social inhibitions and fear of the consequences of
making such a statement. Such a situation could suggest that it is more likely
they intended to intimidate or be taken seriously by choosing social media
networks as their communications medium for making the alleged threat.
Second, Justice Blouin characterizes the accused’s impugned Facebook
postings as ‘‘expressions of emotions towards people who might be
sympathetic”53 to the accused and that only a ‘‘fortuitous search” brought it
to the attention of the authorities. However, it is readily apparent from the facts
in this case that the accused’s impugned Facebook postings were publicly
accessible and not part of a private profile (because they were found by a CAS
employee doing a search of Facebook). They were not merely available for
viewing by people who were ‘‘sympathetic” to the accused (i.e., his ‘‘friends”).
Even if they were, this does not prevent a finding that the accused meant them to
be taken seriously as opposed to intimidate. It is, thus, here that the legal error
identified above becomes material since Justice Blouin did not consider whether
the accused’s threatening posts were intended to be taken seriously.
Furthermore, the fact that a CAS employee identified the threats through a
search is also immaterial to whether the accused intended them to be taken
seriously. It is not necessary for an uttering threats conviction for the threat to be
communicated to the subject.54 However, when the subject of the alleged threats
found out about them, they were concerned enough to report it to police, which
is circumstantial evidence that may be considered in determining whether the
accused intended the threat to intimidate or be taken seriously. 55
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Networked Self: Identity, Community, and Culture on Social Media Sites (New York:
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Third, Justice Blouin contrasts the accused’s threatening Facebook postings
with the accused’s interactions with CAS in person, stating that in the latter the
accused was ‘‘polite and concerned” and, reasoning that ‘‘[i]f his intent was to
intimidate he had plenty of opportunity, yet did nothing.”56 Again, we see the
taint of legal error and the concept of an ‘‘alternate persona” significantly
affecting the analysis by Justice Blouin. Someone could very well intend their
threat be taken seriously by those to whom it was communicated on a social
media network, while keeping their intention or purposes hidden from the
subject of the threat. Alternatively, people may be more apt to make threats with
an intention to intimidate or be taken seriously when they are made on social
media networks as opposed to in face-to-face interactions owing to a fear of
consequences from such a physical interaction.
Finally, Justice Blouin accepted the testimony of the accused that his
threatening Facebook postings were ‘‘to blow off steam as he had been taught in
a prior anger management course”.57 To begin with, it strains credulity that any
legitimate anger management course would ever condone what the accused did in
this case in making what Justice Blouin recognized were objective threats of
death or bodily harm. Regardless, the accused was, by his admission, angry at
losing his son. In acting on his anger, he made repeated and increasingly ominous
threats of death or bodily harm which included a timeline that was taken
seriously enough by police that they arrested the accused on the day that he
stated in his Facebook postings would be the day that he was ‘‘full operation”
with the ‘‘man power” and ‘‘fire power”.58 It is notable that he was not charged
in relation to just one comment on his Facebook page, but a series of threatening
comments that built on each other. This makes it less likely that these can be
characterized as devoid of any intention to be taken seriously or intimidate.
In sum, the decision in R. v. Sather is bad law that should not be followed. It
is based on a patent legal error with respect to the mental fault requirement for
uttering threats, contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which taints the
factual analysis throughout. Justice Blouin’s decision also relied on problematic
and outdated evidence regarding alternate personas, so courts should not follow
it.

R. v. Lee
In R. v. Lee,59 the accused came to the attention of the York University
Security and Toronto Police Service for Facebook postings including images of
swastikas, a reference to the Virginia Tech massacre (where 32 people were killed
by a gunman), and anti-Semitic statements. A detective with the Toronto Police
55
56
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58
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Service cautioned the accused about the postings, but no charges were laid at that
time.60 Just over a month later, on November 10, 2009, the accused made the
following posting on his own Facebook page and was charged with uttering
threats in relation to it:
I’m wearing black and I’m riding black this time around . . . I’m really
sorry however you never thought this day would come, and didn’t want
it to be this way . . . I never knew why you would frame me nor put me
on the cross for a few dollars . . . but I don’t care, if you are a priest,
judge, cop, lawyer, commoner, or teacher . . . I ’m bringing death with
me this time around.61

Puzzlingly, the Crown submitted that this alleged threat was made against
the accused’s 273 Facebook ‘‘friends”. Yet the plain language of this Facebook
posting is not directed against, or limited to, such persons. Rather, it is an alleged
threat of death against anyone. The accused wrote: ‘‘I don’t care, if you are a
priest, judge, cop, lawyer, commoner, or teacher . . . I ’m bringing death with
me”. In other words, it was an indiscriminate threat, which is a common aspect
of mass shootings and sufficiently captured by the language of s. 264.1(1)(a),
which refers to threats causing death or bodily harm to ‘‘any person”. Despite
this flaw in the Crown’s framing of the charges, it did not affect the outcome of
the case. The prosecution failed for other reasons. Justice K. Wright of the
Ontario Court of Justice was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused’s posting was intended as a threat to intimidate or be taken seriously.
Unfortunately, Justice Wright’s description of how Facebook works is
inaccurate, both as it existed at the time, and presently. This factual error led to a
flawed analysis of the accused’s mental fault, as well as a problematic statement
about the seriousness of statements made on Facebook that should not be
followed. Justice Wright wrote:
This case is unique because the alleged threat comes in the form of a
posting that was made by Mr. Lee on his Facebook page. It is
noteworthy that this was a posting on Mr. Lee’s Facebook page as
opposed to a message he posted on someone else’s Facebook page. At
the time it was made, 273 people had access to Mr. Lee’s Facebook.
These authorized individuals are commonly known as ‘‘friends” in the
Facebook environment. The Crown alleges that all those individual or
‘‘friends” that would have had access to Mr. Lee’s Facebook were the
subject of the threat. It is noteworthy that in order for any of his friends
to read the posting they would have had to access Mr. Lee’s Facebook
page. There is no way for Mr. Lee to confirm that a friend has read his
message unless they write a reply comment or tell him directly that they
have done so. If Mr. Lee meant the message to be taken seriously, it
seems to me he would want to ensure that his target audience would
have received it. The Facebook format I have reviewed, of which Mr.
60
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Lee was well aware, diminishes the seriousness that can be attached to
the words written by Mr. Lee on this occasion.62

The impugned Facebook posting in R. v. Lee was made on November 10,
2009, yet Facebook’s ‘‘News Feed” feature had already been launched over three
years prior, in September 2006. Facebook’s News Feed provides users with a
constant stream of updates of the Facebook activities, including postings, of
their friends.63 Consequently, Justice Wright was incorrect in stating that in
order for the accused’s posting to be read, his friends necessarily had to access
the accused’s Facebook page directly.64 Instead, when the accused made his
posting on Facebook, in addition to it appearing on his own Facebook profile, it
would have been broadcast to any number of his friends on their News Feed,
depending on algorithms that Facebook uses.65
Consequently, Justice Wright’s finding that ‘‘[i]f Mr. Lee meant the message
to be taken seriously, it seems to me he would want to ensure that his target
audience would have received it”66 is problematic due to an inaccurate and
overly restrictive understanding of how Facebook postings are disseminated.
Likewise, Justice Wright’s conclusion that ‘‘[t]he Facebook format [. . .]
diminishes the seriousness that can be attached to the words written by Mr. Lee
on this occasion”67 is based on a fundamental error in understanding how this
social media platform functions, and should not be followed by other courts. It is
troubling that this statement has already been extracted as part of the ratio of the
decision and reproduced in a law review article without the authors noting that
the underlying factual basis for it is wrong.68
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The mere fact that an alleged threat was made on a social media network
does not make it automatically more or less serious. There are arguments that cut
both ways. On one hand, using social media’s emblematic function to broadcast
the threat to a large number of people or to the public at large may suggest the
accused intended to intimidate or be taken seriously. On the other hand, many
individuals appear to post their life almost as a stream of consciousness,
providing a narration or curated record of their lives. This diary-like use of social
media suggests that they did not intend their postings to be taken particularly
seriously. Indeed, in R. v. Lee, Justice Wright analyzed the accused’s pattern of
Facebook activity in order to determine whether the accused had the requisite
mental fault. Justice Wright specifically highlighted that the accused ‘‘had a habit
of reporting almost hourly what he was doing” and that these were ‘‘littered with
biblical references and his political opinions”.69 As a result of these competing
explanations for the relevance of the social media context, caution must be
exercised in making the fact-specific determinations required in these cases.
The accused in R. v. Lee testified that the Facebook posting that was the
subject of the death threats charge was not a threat at all. Instead, he testified
that he was making reference to his experience working for the coroner during
the H1N1 outbreak transporting dead bodies. He testified he wrote about
wearing black because that was the color of the uniform that he wore while doing
so. The judge assumed the reference to ‘‘riding black” referred to the color of the
vehicle he drove. In cross-examination, the accused was able to refer to a specific
biblical passage alluded to in the post. The judge found the accused frequently
made biblical references related to death on his Facebook page.70 Justice Wright
recognized ‘‘[a]bsent this explanation, it is easy to see how this posting could have
been interpreted as a threat. [. . .] The context of threat combined with Mr. Lee’s
explanation as to when and why he wrote the message has left me in a state of
reasonable doubt.”71
Despite Justice Wright’s errors with respect to how Facebook actually
operates (i.e., a lack of knowledge of the News Feed function), there is
nevertheless a sound basis for an acquittal in this case given the accused’s
explanation and the trial judge’s findings in this regard. This case demonstrates
how difficult it will be to know in any given situation whether what objectively
appears to be a threat of death or bodily harm satisfying the actus reus of the
offence in s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is, in fact, criminal, owing to the
complexities of investigating and then proving subjective mental fault.
It is reasonable to conclude, however, setting aside the factual errors in R. v.
Lee concerning how Facebook actually operates, that had the accused not
testified and provided his explanation of the impugned Facebook posting that he
could have been properly convicted. This is because inferences could reasonably
69
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be drawn from the evidence that he intended the alleged threat to intimidate or
be taken seriously. For example: the plain-language of the posting; the other
postings of the accused which included images of swastikas and anti-Semitic
comments; a reference to the mass shooting at Virgina Tech; and the reference to
wearing black, which it could be argued was an allusion to the notorious black
trench coats worn by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold who were the shooters at
Columbine High School on April 20, 1999.72

R. c. Joad
In R. c. Joad,73 the accused appealed his convictions for uttering threats,
contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and counseling the commission of
an indictable offence (murder), contrary to s. 464 of the Criminal Code. The
accused, who was born in Syria, made a Facebook posting that said: ‘‘We must
start by killing Assad’s media reporters”74 (referring to Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad).
The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial,
finding that the trial judge’s very brief oral decision on these serious charges did
not meet the minimum requirement for providing reasons. The trial judge failed
to refer at all to the accused’s testimony, including the explanation given by the
accused for his impugned Facebook comments: namely, that his intention was
that pro-Assad journalists should only be killed after lawful trials in Syria, which
retains the death penalty. The accused denied wanting to encourage anyone to do
anything illegal. The appellate court rejected the Crown’s submission that this
explanation went to motive and not to intention, instead finding that the
accused’s explanation provided context to interpret the accused’s impugned
Facebook postings.
Notably, the accused deleted the impugned comments once he realized that
they were leading to confusion. Great care must be exercised in considering
evidence that the accused deleted impugned social media postings that allegedly
constitute an offence. The principle of contemporaneity requires that the mental
fault of the accused be considered at the time they committed the actus reus of the
offence. While post-offence conduct of many varieties may be circumstantial
evidence of intention, in uttering threats cases the ultimate determination must
always be whether the accused intended their threat to be taken seriously or
intimidate at the time that they made the alleged threat.
In uttering threats cases, evidence that the accused deleted their impugned
social media postings could cut either way, based on the particular circumstances
of the case. For example, imagine that the accused saw that their comments were
being interpreted differently than they intended, and they deleted them because
72

73
74

Jefferson Country Sheriff, ‘‘The Trench Coat Mafia & Associates”, CNN, online:
<http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/columbine.cd/Pages/MAFIA_TEXT.htm> (accessed 23 February 2018).
R. c. Joad, 2016 QCCA 1940, 2016 CarswellQue 11502 (C.A.) [Joad].
Ibid, at Annex (unofficial English translation).

92

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[16 C.J.L.T.]

they never intended their comments to be taken that way. On the other hand,
imagine a situation where the accused deleted their impugned postings only after
the postings began to be commented on, or shared on a given social media
network, since the accused became fearful that the notoriety of their postings
would bring them to the attention of authorities. In other words, the postings
were deleted to attempt to destroy evidence of the offence, i.e., a threat they
intended to intimidate or be taken seriously, but then got ‘‘cold feet” about.
Another possibility is that someone may delete a social media threat out of
remorse or regret. While that may affect sentencing, it would not affect their
criminal liability.

R. v. Le Seelleur
Despite the aforementioned difficulties, there are cases where courts have
found the accused had the mental fault for an uttering threats conviction related
to social media conduct. For example, in R. v. Le Seelleur,75 the accused was a
19-year-old student and Pauline Marois was then Premier of Quebec. The
accused read an online CTV news article entitled ‘‘Pauline Marois ready to call
an election”. The accused shared the article through her Twitter account (she had
over 100 followers), and made the following comment: “Good get the bitch out
of there before I bomb her”.76 The accused was charged, inter alia, with uttering
threats contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. There was no dispute that
the accused’s Twitter comment constituted a threat, given ‘‘the clear and
unambiguous words written by the accused and the context in which they were
uttered and conveyed”.77
The only issue was whether the accused had the requisite mental fault for
uttering threats under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The accused testified at
trial that she wrote the comment ‘‘without thinking about it clearly” and ‘‘had no
intention of anything”.78 She stated that she posted the tweet in a moment of
anger after a comment made by the Premier, and admitted during crossexamination that she was frustrated about various things the Premier was
doing.79
Justice Yvan Poulin held that the accused in R. v. Le Seelleur had the
requisite mens rea for uttering threats and convicted her of the offence, finding:
Although she claims that she wrote the post ‘‘without thinking clearly”
and ‘‘without meaning what was written”, it is clear from the evidence
that it came from an operating mind that was angry and frustrated. Her
frustration was unmistakably vocalized in a serious threatening and
75
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intimidating manner. Although it might have been written in a ‘‘split
second”, it was still a conscious act which was clearly intimidating and
threatening. [. . .] the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that at the precise moment the message was posted, the accused — who
was angry and frustrated at the Prime Minister — had the requisite
intention to be taken seriously.80

Justice Poulin’s finding that the accused had the intention to be taken
seriously is based on her admission that, at the time she made the impugned
Facebook posting, she was ‘‘angry and frustrated” at then Premier Marois. The
inference being drawn here is that someone acting out of anger and frustration
intends to be taken seriously. While this same inference could have been drawn,
but was not, in R. v. Sather, this inference was made in R. v. Hayes, discussed
next, revealing an inconsistency in how such evidence is assessed.

R. v. Hayes
In R. v. Hayes,81 Justice R. Green of the Saskatchewan Provincial Court
found the accused guilty of uttering threats, contrary to s. 264.1 of the Criminal
Code, for two Facebook postings that he made threatening Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau.82
In two separate statements to police after making each of these Facebook
postings, the accused made incriminating statements. Justice Green found that
the accused ‘‘was politically opposed to the Prime Minister, angry about
decisions taken by the Prime Minister’s government and frustrated by the
perceived effects these decisions had on his own financial situation”. 83 Justice
Green noted that nothing in what the accused said suggested that he had made
the Facebook postings in jest.84 Justice Green had no hesitation in concluding
that a reasonable person would find that the accused’s impugned Facebook
postings constituted a threat against the Prime Minister.
With respect to mental fault, the defence argued that the accused was
frustrated and attempting ‘‘to rally others to political action — that he did not
intend to utter a threat, but only to express an opinion”.85 Justice Green rejected
this argument, finding that the accused intended both to be taken seriously and
to intimidate in making the threats, based both on the language of the postings
themselves and several incriminating statements made by the accused to police. 86
Justice Green also distinguished the decision in R. v. Sather (discussed above):
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I, however, am satisfied that the Sather case can be distinguished from
that of Mr. Hayes, as no evidence was presented at the trial, either by
Mr. Hayes or by an expert on his behalf, to suggest what he intended in
making the posts or how he used Facebook or that he had a false
persona on Facebook. Nor was there any evidence of any ongoing
dialogue between Mr. Hayes and the Prime Minister. While his
comments may have been directed on the Internet to a group which
included people who shared his political views and frustration,
nevertheless it is clear to me that the best evidence of Mr. Hayes’
intent in making these posts is that contained in his two statements he
gave to the RCMP, which I have referred to above.87

The evidence on intention is even stronger in R. v. Hayes than in R. v. Le
Seelleur, owing to the many incriminating statements made by Hayes to the
police. However, for both of these accused, their threats were similar in two
ways: they were both manifestations of anger and frustration with politicians,
and there was no intention to act on the threats. This highlights the fact that an
intention to act on a threat is not required for the uttering threats offence to be
committed.88

2. Social Media Threats Made Against Women, Minority Groups, and
Politicians
Women, minority groups and politicians were three groups that were readily
observed as targets of social media threats in reported judicial decisions. Indeed,
international research into social media crime suggests that the prevalence of
sexism, racism and Islamophobia online disproportionately affects women and
minority groups.89

Social media threats against women
There are numerous reported judicial decisions involving social media threats
against women.90 In all but one of these cases, the accused was male. 91 Social
media threats included sexist language and sexualized violence.
The language used by the accused in making a threat against then Quebec
Premier Pauline Marois in R. v. Le Seelleur was infused with sexism, referring to
87
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the former Premier as a ‘‘bitch”.92 In R. v. Hayes,93 the accused made a
Facebook posting for which he was not charged in relation to Alberta Premier
Rachel Notley, referring to both her and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as
‘‘scab, mofo’s, bloodsucking politicians”.94 These decisions are explored further
below under the sub-heading of social media threats against politicians.
There are three other notable reported judicial decisions to date dealing with
uttering threats against women. The first two involve threats against females by
male accused in a relationship context, while the third was a threat made by a
man against all women.

R. v. D. (D.)
In R. v. D. (D.),95 the male accused (who was under 18 years of age at the
time) and the 16-year-old female complainant met at a school band performance.
Several days after they met, the accused and the complainant had a conversation
on Facebook where the accused made disturbing statements involving graphic
sexualized violence that he told the complainant he wanted to do to her. 96 In
response to these comments, the complainant protested that he could not do any
of those things to her and that she would not allow a man to harm her. She said
that she was ‘‘scared that he’d act out and cut me and rape me”.97
In searching the accused’s backpack incidental to arrest, the police found a
note with large block letters saying ‘‘KILLER RAPE DEATH” with a handwritten note stating, inter alia, ‘‘I can only get pleasure, sexual pleasure, if the
female is undergoing extreme pain, being raped, abused, tortured, or simply
crying.” The note then described, in detail, specific acts of extreme sexual
violence and sadism.98
Defence counsel submitted that the accused was not uttering threats in his
Facebook conversation with the complainant but was simply conveying his
fantasies or desires, but not his intentions.99 The accused did not testify or call
any evidence.
Justice J.A. De Filippis of the Ontario Court of Justice found that the
accused’s statements to the complainant in the Facebook conversation were
meant to be taken seriously. When the accused described his violent desires, the
complainant told him to calm down and he responded by saying ‘‘I don’t care if u
want it to happen or not“. After considering all of the circumstances, in finding
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the accused guilty of uttering threats contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal
Code, Justice De Filippis concluded by stating:
The Facebook conversation reflects his need to cause bodily harm as a
source of sexual gratification. He described the violent nature of the
acts contemplated and sought the complainant’s submission to his
desire. He also said he did not care if she consented. I have no doubt
these words were meant to be taken seriously and that they intimidated
the complainant. Indeed, I am confident he derived pleasure from the
threats themselves.100

R. v. Hirsch
In R. v. Hirsch,101 the accused unsuccessfully appealed his conviction for
uttering threats to cause bodily harm to the complainant, his former girlfriend,
contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The complainant testified that the
accused had been emotionally and physically abusive during their eight-year
relationship and that was her reason for ending it. However, she continued to see
him occasionally, including daily during the week or so before the accused posted
a message on his Facebook account saying that he was going to choke her and
shoot her with a shotgun. The message also included a nude image of the
complainant.102 In addition to reporting this message and the image to police,
the complainant reported it to Facebook who replied later that the postings had
been taken down. However, it was unclear whether Facebook or the accused
actually removed the postings.

R. v. Hunt
In the Quebec case of R. v. Hunt,103 the self-represented accused was charged
with uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm on Facebook against all
women, contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. A woman had called 911
after ‘‘surfing on the Internet” and reading a message on Facebook that
frightened her. The message looked like a suicide note and general threat against
women, referring to the December 6, 1989 killing of 14 women at the École
Polytechnique de Montréal by Marc Lépine, before he died by suicide.104 The
reported decision in this case relates to various Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms motions brought by the accused, all of which were dismissed by the
court.
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Social media threats against minority groups
R. c. Rioux
In R. c. Rioux,105 the accused was charged with uttering threats of death or
bodily harm to Muslims, contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and
public incitement of hatred, contrary to s. 319(1) of the Criminal Code, in relation
to comments that he made on TVA’s Facebook page as part of a discussion
forum. The discussion was related to a TVA Facebook posting entitled ‘‘Two
Montreal imams unequivocally condemn the murders of the two Canadian
soldiers”. Comments then followed from members of the public on the TVA
Facebook page.
The accused wrote the following on the TVA Facebook page as part of this
discussion: ‘‘I can’t wait to get my hunting licence so that I can stick their fucking
heads on my truck hood!!!!”106 Other people then replied to the accused’s posting
stating he had made a death threat. He responded to them, stating, inter alia,
‘‘We’re going to exterminate your sub-race. :) [. . .] Damn I can’t wait to get my
licence!!107
The accused gave a brief statement to police saying he was ‘‘just fooling
around” and when he saw the comments on his comment, he ‘‘panicked”. 108
Justice Roy of the Court of Québec rejected the accused’s explanation, finding
instead that, ‘‘[f]ar from showing a sense of panic, his statements are made with
hostility and persistence”.109 While Justice Roy convicted the accused of public
incitement of hatred, contrary to s. 319(1) of the Criminal Code, the accused was
acquitted of uttering threats, contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
Justice Roy found that there was ‘‘no evidence” of either the actus reus or mens
rea for uttering threats, finding as follows:
There is a fundamental difference between making comments that are
hateful in nature and encourage the sharing of this negative feeling, and
making statements that constitute a threat.
The image used by the accused of resorting to decapitation and
dismembering the victim as though he were a trophy is an example of
this difference.
The comment reflects a feeling of hatred without, however, constituting
an actual threat, given the manner in which the idea is expressed, such
as, for example, the reservation about obtaining a licence.
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It must nevertheless be admitted that the comment about exterminating
the sub-race is closer to the wrongful act in question, although it does
not fundamentally change the scope of the discourse.
A well-informed, reasonable person should consider all the comments
which, in the Court’s view, are more closely associated with hate speech
than with making actual threats.
As for intent, the Court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused sought to intimidate or arouse fear.
His comments tend to insinuate and persistently share a perception
characterized by detestation, but they do not reflect a wish to sow fear
and intimidate.
Consequently, the accused is acquitted of this offence.110

There are numerous problems with this reasoning that make the acquittal in
this case suspect. To begin with, the entire framework of Justice Roy’s analysis
presumes public incitement of hatred and uttering threats are mutually exclusive
offences.111 While there are fundamental differences between these offences, 112
they certainly do not preclude the conduct of an accused constituting both public
incitement of hatred and uttering threats. As the Supreme Court of Canada held
in its seminal uttering threats case of R. v. McRae, ‘‘the words do not have to be
directed towards a specific person; a threat against an ascertained group of
people is sufficient”.113
Rather than directly applying the law of uttering threats, Justice Roy
employs this problematic and undefined notion of ‘‘fundamental difference” 114
between these two offences in considering whether the accused is guilty of
uttering threats. Having already found the accused guilty of public incitement of
hatred, Justice Roy’s conclusion is that the facts of this case are ‘‘more closely
110
111
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associated with hate speech than with making actual threats.”115 This is not
appropriate legal reasoning at the stage of determining criminal liability. It is not
a question of which of the two charged offences better fits the conduct of the
accused at this stage. A trial judge in these circumstances must consider each
offence independently and determine whether the Crown has proven the essential
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only if there are findings of guilt for
multiple offences in relation to the same conduct that an issue may arise as to
whether it is appropriate to enter convictions for each offence or apply the rule in
R. v. Kineapple.116
In considering the accused’s comments posted on the TVA Facebook page,
Justice Roy effectively evaluates each comment of the accused in isolation, rather
than in their entire context, which is problematic and inconsistent with R. v.
McRae.117 The accused goes so far as to say ‘‘[w]e’re going to exterminate your
sub-race”, yet Justice Roy does not consider that a reasonable person in these
circumstances would find that this constituted a threat, finding only that it comes
close to being one. A more obvious objective threat in relation to a minority
group is difficult to conceive. In R. v. McRae, the Supreme Court of Canada also
stated that ‘‘witness opinions are relevant to the application of the reasonable
person standard; however, they are not determinative”.118 In R. c. Rioux, the
accused’s comments on the TVA Facebook page drew immediate reaction from
witnesses to them, who explicitly identified them as death threats and advised the
accused that he would be sent to jail.119 Justice Roy erred in failing to consider
this evidence.
With respect to mental fault, while Justice Roy correctly identified the
relevant legal standard from R. v. McCrae as intent either to intimidate or be
taken seriously,120 this standard was not actually applied in the analysis. Instead,
Justice Roy only expressly considered whether the accused’s comments reflected
‘‘a wish to sow fear and intimidate”.121 Justice Roy did not examine whether the
accused intended his comments to be taken seriously.
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The myriad problems and legal errors with the reasoning in R. c. Rioux
means that it should not be followed and its conclusions are suspect. Had the
case been appealed, and a new trial ordered, the result could have been different.

R. v. Lee
In R. v. Lee,122 the accused was not charged with a threat in relation to a
minority group. However, he first came to the attention of police because, inter
alia, he had posted images of swastikas and anti-Semitic comments. 123 The
accused openly admitted his ‘‘disdain” for the Jewish community. 124

R. v. Hayes
In the course of making a Facebook posting, for which he was convicted of
uttering threats against Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the accused in R. v.
Hayes125 made derogatory comments against Muslims, which he accused the
Prime Minister of being: ‘‘[t]his asshole is a Muslim who stands against
everything western culture in Canada has built and fought for for over a hundred
years.”126

Social media threats against politicians
Politicians are the final group of victims of social media threats that were
observed in reported judicial decisions, and many more similar cases appear in
media reporting. In R. v. Hayes,127 the accused was convicted of uttering threats,
contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, against Prime Minister Justin for
two Facebook postings. The accused had also made a posting for which he was
not charged in relation to Alberta Premier Rachel Notley.128 As noted above,
then Quebec Premier Pauline Marois was the subject of the threat in R. v. Le
Seelleur for which the accused was convicted.129

3. Social Media Threats are Being Made by People with Mental Health
Challenges
There are a number of reported judicial decisions involving social media
threats made or allegedly made by people with mental health challenges. This
raises questions about what the appropriate preventative responses to social
media crime and the use of punitive measures are when dealing with an accused
121
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who faces mental health challenges, but nevertheless falls short of being found
not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.
In R. v. Hunt,130 the self-represented accused had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia and had previously been found not criminally responsible on
account of mental disorder for falsely telling the police that he had killed a
woman.131
In R. v. Boissoneau,132 the accused communicated via Twitter with Islamic
extremists and supporters of ISIS, going as far as writing, ‘‘[g]ive me Canadian
addresses. I will ensure something happens.”133 He pled guilty to uttering threats,
contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, for making this statement but
appealed his sentenced of one year imprisonment. Justice H.M. Pierce of the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice reduced the sentence to six months’
imprisonment, given the accused’s circumstances. The accused was an
Aboriginal man who suffered a brain injury, was diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol
Spectrum Disorder, and was raised by his father who had been exposed to a
residential school. Justice Pierce also noted that he had few followers on Twitter,
that he did not actually intend to engage in terrorist activity, and that the offence
was essentially a nuisance to law enforcement.
In R. v. D. (D.),134 the accused had previously cut himself and spent four
months in a psychiatric facility.135 In R. v. Lee,136 the accused, though acquitted,
was described by the trial judge as ‘‘clearly a troubled individual”. 137

4. Issues with Social Media Content as Evidence
In most reported judicial decisions concerning threats allegedly committed
on social media networks, there is no discussion of any evidentiary issues. The
accused in these cases typically admitted that they made the statements, which
were admitted as evidence. One exception is the decision in R. v. Hirsch138 where
the accused appealed his conviction for uttering threats against his former
girlfriend on Facebook, arguing, inter alia, that the trial judge erred in admitting
and relying on screenshots of the accused’s Facebook page. The Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s submission, holding that the screenshots
were sufficiently authenticated, consistent with s. 33.1 of the Canada Evidence
Act,139 stating that the requirement is not onerous, such that, ‘‘to authenticate an
130
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electronic document, counsel could present it to a witness for identification and,
presumably, the witness would articulate some basis for authenticating it as what
it purported to be”.140
As to the integrity of the screenshots of the accused’s Facebook postings in
R. v. Hirsch, although they had been provided by a friend of the complainant to
her and then to the police, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found that the trial
judge adequately addressed the issue of integrity by identifying pieces of evidence
that led to the conclusion that it would be speculative to conclude that anyone
but the accused had authored the messages or that they had been altered.141 The
appellate court held that:
. . . the screen captures are the best evidence available to the Crown to
adduce Mr. Hirsch’s Facebook page itself into evidence. Indeed, given
the fluidity and impermanence of postings on a Facebook page, a
screen capture may be one of the few ways of establishing what was
actually posted on a Facebook page at any point in time.142

5. Rejection of Freedom of Expression Claims in Relation to Social Media
Threats
Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides
constitutional protection for freedom of expression as a fundamental freedom:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
.....
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication;

Historically, based on the broad interpretation that the Supreme Court of
Canada has given this fundamental freedom, it was considered that s. 264.1 of
the Criminal Code infringed freedom of expression as guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the
Charter, but was nevertheless saved by s. 1 of the Charter.143 However, in a
contemporary judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that threats of
violence are excluded from protection under s. 2(b) of the Charter entirely.144 As
Chief Justice McLachlin wrote for a unanimous Court in R. v. Khawaja:145
This Court’s jurisprudence supports the proposition that the exclusion
of violence from the s. 2(b) guarantee of free expression extends to
threats of violence. [. . .] It makes little sense to exclude acts of violence
140
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from the ambit of s. 2(b), but to confer protection on threats of
violence. Neither are worthy of protection. Threats of violence, like
violence, undermine the rule of law. [. . .] They undermine the very
values and social conditions that are necessary for the continued
existence of freedom of expression [. . .] Threats of violence fall outside
the s. 2(b) guarantee of free expression.146

Given this position, it is not surprising that a reported judicial decision
dealing with an alleged social media threat rejected a claim that s. 264.1 of the
Criminal Code infringes s. 2(b) of the Charter. However, there has been no
reported case to date that has been fully argued in this context with the benefit of
counsel. R. v. Khawaja would appear to preclude such a claim.
In R. v. Hunt,147 the self-represented accused, who was charged with uttering
a threat to cause death or bodily harm on Facebook against all women, brought
various Charter motions, including that what he wrote was protected by s. 2(b) of
the Charter and, therefore, the evidence of what he wrote could not be used
against him. Justice of the Court of Quebec Richard Marleau dismissed the
motion, stating that while s. 2(b) of the Charter generally protects freedom of
expression, it is subject to limitation under s. 1 of the Charter, of which the
uttering threats offence is one example.148 While the reasoning in R. v. Hunt on
this issue is not particularly detailed and does not cite any authority, the outcome
is correct.

CONCLUSION
The uttering threats offence in s. 264.1 of the Criminal Code was enacted well
before any notion of the Internet or social media networks. Given that the
genesis of this legacy offence is hundreds of years old at common law, it is
remarkable that it has been able to function at all in this new virtual
environment.
The difficulties of establishing mental fault in social media threats cases is by
far the most challenging aspect for the prosecution in reported judicial decisions.
However, part of the problem is a major legal error in the earliest social media
threats decision in R. v. Sather with respect to the legal test for mental fault under
s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code as well as reliance on ‘‘expert” evidence that
may not have been properly admitted and, at any rate, is based on outmoded
conceptions of online identity. This decision is bad law and should not be
followed. A similar legal error was made in R. c. Rioux, which was compounded
by failing to consider evidence of the reaction of witnesses to the alleged threat,
and effectively treating the uttering threats offence in s. 264.1(1)(a) of the
Criminal Code and public incitement of hatred offence in s. 391(1) of the Criminal
Code as mutually exclusive at the stage of determining criminal liability. Even
146
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when the correct legal standard was employed, mental fault analysis in social
media threats cases has sometimes been flawed due to factual errors resulting in a
misunderstanding of the basic aspects of social media networks, such as
Facebook’s News Feed in R. v. Lee.149
As discussed above, international literature has found that threats against
women and minority groups are prevalent on social media networks. It is
troubling to see cases where threats are made involving sexualized violence
against women, such as the horrific threats in R. v. D. (D.),150 and the
combination of so-called ‘‘revenge porn” and threats against women in R. v.
Hirsch.151 It is difficult to understand a valid legal basis for acquittals in cases
such as R. c. Rioux,152 where the accused was charged with uttering threats of
death or bodily harm to Muslims in such explicit terms.
An interesting issue identified in this study was that several of these cases
involved threats made by people with mental health challenges, including a
person with schizophrenia,153 a person with a brain injury and FASD,154 a
person who had cut themselves and been admitted to a psychiatric facility for
several months,155 and another person who was described as ‘‘clearly a troubled
individual”.156 My research is also investigating criminal harassment offences
involving social media networks and there are numerous cases where people with
mental health challenges have been charged with criminal harassment and found
not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder. Further research is
needed into the relationship between social media crime and mental health.
It was surprising that not many evidentiary issues were raised or decided in
reported judicial decisions involving social media threats, particularly given the
nature of this new technology. However, there are numerous cases related to
other offences that this research study has uncovered that make this an
important topic warranting further study.157
Finally, this article has also found that there has been very little
consideration of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter in social
media threats cases. Freedom of expression features prominently in public
debates around social media networks and the controversy around efforts to
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regulate or address their context by social media network providers. However,
owing to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Khawaja,158 such
claims in respect of threats of death or bodily harm will likely be unsuccessful
since that decision clarifies that threats of violence do not warrant s. 2(b) Charter
protection. There remains scope for arguments that a given posting, while
objectively appearing to be a threat to a reasonable person, was made in jest or as
political satire and, thus, is not criminal in nature.
This article has explored and critiqued the current state of Canadian criminal
law on threats made on social media networks. While it has revealed some
insights into the issues and trends related to social media threats, it is based on
reported judicial decisions and as such, only provides part of the picture. Further
research is needed into social media crime in Canada given the large proportion
of Canadians who are active in these global digital communities. Conducting
qualitative and quantitative research into threats committed on social media
networks (and other offences such as sexual offences, criminal harassment and
terrorism-related offences) would be a valuable exercise to examine some of the
preliminary issues and themes identified in this article, such as threats made
against women and visible minorities, and threats made by people with mental
health challenges.
Another issue for further research is whether the uttering threats offence in s.
264.1(1) of the Criminal Code as it is currently framed is appropriate for routine
enforcement on social media networks. The breadth of the uttering threats
offence has steadily expanded since its original statutory enactment, hastened
along by both judicial interpretation and Parliamentary reform. It is very much
an inchoate crime, particularly given that the subject of the threat does not even
need to be aware that it is made, threats of psychological harm are sufficient, and
the accused does not have to have any intention or ability to actually follow
through on the threat. Applying such a broad and expansive offence in the
virtual world of social media networks, where there can be massive distance
between the accused and the subject of a threat can lead to concerns about overcriminalization. While the actus reus of this offence is quite broad, it is reigned in
to a large degree by the mens rea requirement that the accused must intend the
threat to intimidate or be taken seriously. As discussed with respect to the
purpose of the offence, an ancillary purpose of the offence appears to be the
suppression of threats of death or bodily harm because of their potential negative
effect on third parties and society. Yet that is an even further step removed from
the harm threatened to be caused.
Given the broad scope of the offence in s. 264.1(1) of the Criminal Code and
the extensive virtual terrain covered by social media networks, police and
prosecutorial discretion play a major role in selecting and prioritizing which
social media threats will actually be pursued in practice. In that context, it is not
surprising that criminal charges for threats against political leaders made on
158
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social media networks are becoming more common. While they may not be more
prevalent, they are more likely to be identified through pro-active enforcement
and taken more seriously as part of a precautionary security strategy. This also
raises concerns about access to justice for victims through the equal protection of
the law. As in many areas of policing, the response to social media threats against
typical users appears to be ad hoc and complaint driven.
Additional research is needed to examine how police and Crown prosecutors
are dealing with social media threats since most criminal incidents reported to the
authorities do not result in charges. It would be valuable to understand the
reasons behind decisions to investigate or charge, and whether there is any
consistency in making such determinations. It is notable that foreign
jurisdictions, such as the UK Crown Prosecution Service, have published
guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social
media.159 Such transparency would be laudable in Canada, particularly given
how broadly the offence is framed and how widespread such threats appear to be
on social media networks.
Canada is a digital nation that is very active on social media networks. With
a better understanding of these issues, law reform, and the policy options of both
government and social media platforms, should be developed to enhance the
response to crime on social media networks. While these technologies promise
many benefits, there is a darker side to social media networks. As our
understanding of the risks deepens, so too must our response become more
sophisticated.

159

U.K. Crown Prosecution Service, ‘‘Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media”, online: <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/>.

